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Abstract 
 
Most, if not all, professional sports leagues have adopted an internal structure that 
provides much economic success, but that creates a division within each league 
composed of two sides: the owners of the teams and the players on those teams.  Due to 
this division and the creation of goals that usually contrast with each other, there has long 
been strife between the two factions.  In most cases both parties are able to come together 
and formulate an agreement, but on rare occasions one group decides that it is time to act 
on their dissatisfaction, anger, or even greed and refuse to participate in these 
negotiations.  This generally leads to an owners’ lockout or a players’ strike, similar to 
those found in other industries.  After an extensive meta-analysis, conducted using data 
and research from past sports strikes and lockouts, I have found that the effects of a work 
stoppage on the strength of a league is not uniform, that players salaries generally are 
negatively affected, and that players most often lose the most as a result. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The first professional sports leagues in the United States were established in the 
mid-to-late 19
th
 century.  Early labor negotiations consisted of each player being paid by 
the owner or manager on a per game basis, usually from a portion of ticket revenue.  
Over time owners and managers began to realize the moneymaking potential of 
professional sports, and not long after the players caught on as well.  The first major legal 
battle between players and owners didn’t occur until 1969 when Curt Flood of Major 
League Baseball’s St. Louis Cardinals refused to report to the Philadelphia Phillies after 
being traded.  Flood and the MLB Players’ Union took their antitrust lawsuit to the 
Supreme Court, who eventually ruled in favor of the MLB.  However the Supreme 
Court’s decision led to the end of the reserve clause in 1975 and the start of free agency, 
which has since been adopted by all other major sports leagues in the United States. 
 Since Curt Flood’s lawsuit, players have become more aware of their legal rights 
and have formed large and formidable players’ unions and associations, one for each 
league.  These unions work on the players’ behalf to ensure that the players receive the 
compensation they deserve, or more realistically what the players believe they deserve in 
addition to other labor-related issues (e.g. rules governing drug testing, player pension 
funds, etc.).  Due to the requirement for all players to join their respective union, team 
owners started using collective bargaining agreements to create rules that all players and 
teams must abide by.  These agreements are contracts and thus must be renewed every 4-
8 years.  Although such contracts are designed to create peace and prosperity for all, it 
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also requires that negotiations occur periodically when new agreements need to be 
written.  When there is a disagreement that cannot be resolved, a work stoppage occurs.  
All four of the major sports leagues in the United States, the National Football League, 
Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey 
League, have had work stoppages in the last 25 years.  These stoppages can have positive 
or negative effects on the strength of professional sports leagues or have few significant 
consequences.  The goal of this study was to determine if work stoppages have effects on 
sports leagues, and if so, what are these effects and the consequences of these effects for 
franchises, players, and the leagues as a whole. 
 
Chapter 2: NHL Lockout 2004-2005 
 The 2004-2005 National Hockey League owners’ lockout was officially 
announced on September 15, 2004, days before the start of the preseason schedule for the 
2004-2005 season.  The previous collective bargaining agreement had expired without an 
extension and negotiations had broken down, causing the owners to impose a lockout.  
The owners’ main request was for a salary cap to bring down rising player salaries but the 
National Hockey League Players’ Association refused to accept any proposal that 
included a salary cap.  From the 1993-1994 season to the 2003-2004 season total players’ 
salaries tripled, but league revenues did not grow at nearly that pace (Staudohar,23).  
Owners argued that they lost $1.8 billion over the course of that decade (Staudohar,23).  
The league had an independent study done just before the lockout to confirm the owners’ 
statements.  The report by Arthur Levitt stated that teams were spending 76% of revenue 
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on players’ salaries, although Forbes contends that this number is actually 66% (Ozanian 
and Badenhausen,21).   Regardless of which numbers are most accurate, either 
percentage is much higher than all other major sports leagues in the United States.  
Coupled with the fact that the NHL was at best third among those leagues in revenues is 
enough cause for the owners’ concern.  After 310 days, 1,230 games lost, an estimated $2 
billion in revenue from tickets, media, sponsorships, and concessions lost, and an 
estimated $1 billion in players’ salaries lost, the lockout officially ended on July 13, 2005 
(Staudohar,23). 
Following the NHL lockout, rule changes were instituted by the league that 
radically altered the game on the ice, creating long-lasting effects to the league.  The 
NHL eliminated the possibility of a game ending in a tie during the regular season and 
added a three player shootout to determine a winner should a standard five minute 
overtime not suffice.  Other rules were discarded to reduce breaks in on-ice action and 
increase scoring chances.  For example, passes between players were allowed to extend 
from one end of the ice to the other, “touch-up” offsides was implemented, and a greater 
emphasis was placed on the calling of penalties for infractions in which attacking skaters 
were obstructed or physically “grabbed” by opponents. 
After these rule changes were instituted, NHL management focused on 
transforming the financial underpinnings of the league as a whole.  Revenue sharing was 
introduced, such that the top 10 revenue-producing teams contributed a portion of their 
revenues to a fund from which the bottom 10 revenue-producing teams could draw at the 
end of the season.  In the three seasons leading up to the lockout, as seen in Figure 1 
below, the overall league operating income was negative each season and totaled 
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$224,000,000, with 16 teams, 20 teams, and 16 teams having negative operating income 
respectively.  In the season following the lockout the overall league operating income 
was $125,100,000 and only eight teams had negative operating income.  Though this new 
system did not ensure that all teams are profitable it is arguable that revenue sharing 
prevented a number of teams from considering relocation or contraction of the league as a 
whole. 
 
 
Also contributing to the increased financial strength of the NHL after the lockout 
was the creation of a league-wide player salary cap, the “deal-breaker’ that the NHL 
players’ association stated they would never accept.  The salary cap is the total amount of 
money that a team can spend on its roster in salary and bonuses.  The upper limit of the 
salary cap was agreed upon to be 54% of total league revenues with a minimum level of 
team salary expenditures set at 55% of the cap (for the 2005-2006 season the upper limit 
was $39,000,000, and the lower limit was $21,450,000) (Staudohar,23).  For the 2010-
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Figure 1 – Data from Ozanian and Badenhausen,21 
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2011 season the upper limit of the salary cap increased to $59,400,000 due to increased 
league revenues and, after changes in the wording for lower limit calculations, the lower 
limit was increased to $40,800,000.  As discussed previously revenues increased after the 
lockout and disparities in operating income between teams were reduced, which leads to 
the question of where much of the extra money came from.  Due to the introduction of 
the salary cap players’ salaries were greatly affected, most commonly in a negative way.  
In the 2003-2004 season the highest paid player by salary, Joe Sakic of the Colorado 
Avalanche, was paid $18,000,000.  Under the new collective bargaining agreement 
players could only be paid up to 20% of the total team salary cap, which was $7,800,000 
for the 2005-2006 season.  As a consequence, upper echelon players lost nearly half of 
their potential salaries, whereas most players were not affected as negatively.  Indeed, 
most mid-level players retained the same or nearly the same salary after the lockout and 
lower level players were affected positively by the salary cap.  The league-wide 
minimum salary was $175,000 for the 2003-2004 season, but was increased to $450,000 
after the lockout with mandated increases every two years (Staudohar,23).  The league-
wide minimum salary for the 2010-2011 season was $500,000, nearly three times as 
much as just seven years earlier.  Also with the creation of a mandated “floor” on team 
salaries teams that were spending relatively little on players’ salaries were forced to 
spend more, usually via increases to the amount paid to all of their players. 
Another addition to the new collective bargaining agreement was the institution of 
a players’ escrow account to ensure that player compensation is an accurate reflection of 
league-wide revenues.  Under the new collective bargaining agreement player 
compensation was limited to 54% of league revenues, but total revenues cannot be 
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predicted with 100% accuracy before a season starts.  Thus the players’ escrow account 
was created to keep this proportion valid.  Players would deposit an adjustable percentage 
of their paychecks in an escrow account after each payment period.  If at the end of the 
year player compensation is under 54%, the players receive compensatory funds from the 
account to create the agreed upon balance.  In turn, if player compensation is over 54% 
the owners receive funds from the account to bring the ratio back to 54%. 
Though many of the changes to the collective bargaining agreement favored 
owners, the players did receive a few benefits.  One benefit required changes to the rules 
regarding free agency.  Under the previous agreement players were only guaranteed free 
agency by the age of 31, meaning a player could spend over half of their career without 
the ability to choose which team they played for.  The new agreement liberalized free 
agency and though it remained at the age of 31 for the 2005-2006 season, it decreased 
subsequently in the following seasons to 29 and then 27 years of age.  This enabled 
players more freedom to choose which team they played for, in effect enabling players to 
attempt to gain their full market potential at an earlier age.  As a consequence, teams 
would have to offer players with expiring contracts more money should they be interested 
in retaining their services.  Although a player could play their entire career for one team, 
the new terms of free agency gave them more control of their careers and thus the total 
compensation that they could expect to receive.  A final addition to the new collective 
bargaining agreement was the implementation of a drug-testing policy and enforcement 
program which has been studied and copied by other leagues around the world. 
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Chapter 3: NHL Lockout 1994-1995 
 The 1994-1995 National Hockey League owners’ lockout began on October 1, 
1994, just days before the 1994-1995 season was set to begin.  The owners decided to 
lockout out the players until the players would agree to a new collective bargaining 
agreement, citing rising players’ costs.  The owners contended that players’ salaries were 
increasing at a rate faster than that of league revenues and that owners were losing money 
as a result.  The owners’ main request was for the league to create a salary cap that would 
lower player costs as well as create more competition between large and small market 
teams.  The players were against the idea of a salary cap, seeing as how it would decrease 
their salaries and limit the free market associated with free agency.  The lockout lasted 
103 days and was ended on January 13, 1995 with the passing of a new collective 
bargaining agreement. 
As a result of the owners’ hard stance on the salary cap issue, the players were 
forced to accept compromises on many additional issues in order to avoid a salary cap in 
the new agreement.  These included minor changes to free agency, salary arbitration, and 
the creation of a rookie wage cap, all of which were in favor of the owners.  Following 
the lockout the league created a 48 game season, down from 82 games, followed by a full 
playoff schedule.  While the new agreement created some immediate stability and 
allowed the players to get back to work, there were long term ramifications of the lockout.  
The lack of a resolution on the salary cap issue led to the subsequent owners’ lockout in 
2004.  Many of the owners and members of team management that were around for the 
1994-1995 lockout cited the inability to solve the salary problem in 1994 as the main 
cause of the lockout in 2004 (RealClearSports,11).  A final consequence was that two of 
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the eight Canadian teams eventually moved to the United States due to lack of public and 
fan support following the 1994-1995 lockout.  Long considered the “hockey stronghold” 
where any team could always prosper, Canadian fans proved just as fickle as Americans 
following the 1994-1995 lockout.  The Winnipeg Jets moved to Phoenix, AZ to become 
the Phoenix Coyotes following the 1995-1996 season.  The Quebec Nordiques moved to 
Denver, CO to become the Colorado Avalanche following the 1994-1995 season. 
 
Chapter 4: MLB Strike 1994-1995 
 The 1994-1995 Major League Baseball players’ strike began on August 12, 1994 
in the middle of the 1994 season.  The previous collective bargaining agreement expired 
on December 31, 1993 and both sides decided to continue with the 1994 season even 
though a governing agreement was not in hand.  The owners were tired of losing money, 
an issue still under debate to this day, and decided that a salary cap, elimination of salary 
arbitration, and other minor changes were in the best interest of the game.  The players 
did not see any benefit for themselves in these changes and rejected the owners’ proposal 
on July 18, 1994.  The Major League Baseball Players’ Association leader Donald Fehr 
threatened that the players would go on strike on August 12, 1994 if a new proposal 
wasn’t created, and in the absence of new proposals from the owners the players went on 
strike.  The rest of the 1994 season was cancelled, including the postseason and the 1994 
World Series.  This was the first season without a World Series since 1904 as well as the 
first time a North American sports league lost a postseason due to a work stoppage.  After 
negotiations stretched throughout the winter and the beginning of spring, a new collective 
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bargaining agreement was reached 232 days later on April 2, 1995.  The 1995 season was 
started a few weeks later and consisted of 144 games, down from 162.  In the new 
agreement the owners were not able to achieve either of their main goals, as a salary cap 
and the end of salary arbitration both were vetoed by the players.  The new agreement did 
include revenue sharing among teams, which allowed for struggling teams to receive a 
revenue boost that owners were pushing for, and a luxury tax to curb spending by high 
payroll teams. 
 Despite the good feelings from the completion of negotiations and the start of a 
new season, there were long-term consequences of the players’ strike.  Attendance, at a 
near record high in the 1994 season before the strike, fell drastically during the 1995 
season.  As seen in Figure 2 below, average attendance was at 31,285 fans per game in 
1994.  In 1995 average attendance dropped to 25,034 fans per game.  In the following 
few years attendance increased by around 1,200 fans per year followed by a few years of 
fluctuating attendance.  It was not until the 2006 season that average attendance reached 
the level it had been at in 1994. 
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 Along with the loss in fan attendance there was a loss in overall fan support, as 
seen in the reduction in television ratings in 1995 and the following seasons.  Baseball 
has long been one of the Americas’ favorite sports, affectionately referred to as the 
“National Pastime”.  Although the National Football League overtook Major League 
Baseball as Americans’ favorite in the 1970’s according to Gallup Polls, Major League 
Baseball remained solidly in second place.  Figure 3 below shows that leading up to the 
1994-1995 strike Major League Baseball was gaining popularity, rating as high as 21% of 
Americans’ favorite sport just four days before the strike began (Gallup,3).  During the 
strike it rated just 16%, and following the end of the strike Major League Baseball’s 
popularity continued to gradually plummet.  As of December 2005 Major League 
Baseball has been overtaken by the National Basketball Association and is currently in 
3
rd
 place among Americans’ favorite sports (Gallup,6). 
-
5,000 
10,000 
15,000 
20,000 
25,000 
30,000 
35,000 
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
*
1
9
9
5
*
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
Season
MLB Average Game Attendance
Figure 2 – Data from Rodney Fort,15 
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 Another long-lasting effect of the 1994-1995 strike was the impact on the stability 
of team operating incomes.  As seen in Figure 4 below it wasn’t until the 2001 season 
that overall team operating income found the stability it had enjoyed prior to the strike in 
1994. 
 
Figure 3 – Data from Gallup Polls, 6 
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A final effect of the 1994-1995 MLB strike was the damage done to the Montreal 
Expos franchise.  The Montreal Expos, a small market team lacking a sustained history of 
success, had the best record in baseball at the beginning of the strike in 1994 at 74 wins 
and 40 losses.  They were widely considered the favorite to win the World Series, a huge 
boost for a middling team, even though they had the second lowest payroll in the league.  
Following the end of the strike in 1995 the Montreal Expos were one of the hardest hit 
teams based on reductions in attendance and fan support.  In each of the following years 
the team continued to lose money and fans.  The Montreal Expos were eventually bought 
by Major League Baseball in 2001 and forced to move to Washington, D.C. in 2004, 
becoming the Washington Nationals. 
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Chapter 5: NBA Lockout 1998-1999 
 The 1998-1999 National Basketball Association owners’ lockout began on July 1, 
1998 after the expiration of the previous collective bargaining agreement and in the 
absence of an approved extension.  The owners’ requests included a maximum salary that 
a single player could receive and a larger percentage of league revenues.  The players’ 
major request was to increase the league minimum salary.  After 191 days of negotiations 
the lockout ended with a new collective bargaining agreement on January 6, 1999.  The 
season started a few weeks later consisting of 50 games, down from 82.  Both sides were 
able to come away with positive outcomes, as owners were able to convince players to 
accept maximum salaries of $9-14 million depending on years in the league as well as a 
rookie pay scale (RealClearSports,10).  Players were able to convince owners to accept a 
modest raise in the league minimum salary. 
 Though both sides came away from the lockout feeling victorious, there were 
enduring consequences of the 1998-1999 lockout.  As seen in Figure 5 below league 
attendance was trending upward before the strike began in 1998.  Average attendance 
was at 17,135 fans per game in the 1997-1998 season and it fell following the end of the 
strike in 1999.  It was not until the 2004-2005 season that attendance reached its 1997-
1998 levels, seven years later. 
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 As attendance fell so did TV ratings and overall league popularity.  Similar to the 
immediate reduction in popularity Major League Baseball suffered following the 1994-
1995 strike, the National Basketball Association’s popularity also decreased immediately 
following the 1998-1999 lockout.  Gallup reported that the NBA was 17% of Americans’ 
favorite sport to watch in April 1997 (Gallup,4).  In November 1998 that figure was 
reduced to 12%, although current polls indicate that the NBA has regained its stature with 
the influx of new talent such as LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Kevin Durant, and 
Dwight Howard (Gallup,6).  This group, as well as others, has the difficult role of filling 
the shoes of the greatest basketball player of all time and the greatest human casualty of 
the 1998-1999 lockout, Michael Jordan.  Michael Jordan retired for a second time during 
the lockout and stayed away for a few years before returning from retirement for a second 
time.  This may account for some of the decrease in attendance, TV ratings, and 
popularity, but overall fan displeasure accounts for the majority of the decrease. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis and Results 
After collecting data from the aforementioned strikes and lockouts, I combined 
the information in an Excel worksheet and analyzed the data.  Below in Table 1 is an 
example of one team, the Atlanta Braves of Major League Baseball, from the Excel 
worksheet.  The “Strength” factor was defined as either a “1” or a “2”, unless the 
franchise did not exist during that season in which case a “0” was used.  A factor of “2” 
meant that the franchise was a strong franchise whereas a “1” meant that the franchise 
was a weak franchise.  A franchise was able to change from strong to weak or vice versa 
over the course of the study, such as the Atlanta Braves did between the 1990 and 1991 
seasons (see below).  The “Strength” factor was calculated using franchise market size 
and strength, franchise fan loyalty, and win-loss records.  Thus a strong franchise usually 
was in a large market, had a loyal fan base, and won 50% or more of its games most 
seasons.  A weak franchise usually was in a small market, had a small fan base, and may 
or may not have won 50% or more of its games in most seasons.  There are exceptions to 
these generalizations such as the Green Bay Packers who are situated in a city of less than 
200,000 people but have one of the most loyal fan bases in all of sports and usually win 
many games, including the Super Bowl this past season.  The “Stoppage?” factor was 
defined as a “0” for no work stoppage, “-1” for the season prior to a work stoppage, “1” 
for the season of a work stoppage, “2” for the season after a work stoppage, and “3” for 
the next season after a work stoppage. 
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League Team Strength Season Stoppage? Revenue Operating Income Average Attendance 
MLB Atlanta Braves 1 1990 0  $        35,400,000   $             15,600,000                                12,100  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 1991 0  $        40,300,000   $                 (500,000)                               26,422  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 1992 0  $        50,700,000   $             (9,000,000)                               37,993  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 1993 -1  $        79,000,000   $             (1,400,000)                               47,960  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 1994 1  $        55,800,000   $             (5,300,000)                               44,548  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 1995 1  $        60,700,000   $             (2,900,000)                               35,581  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 1996 2  $        79,100,000   $                 (300,000)                               35,818  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 1997 3  $     119,600,000   $             18,200,000                                42,771  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 1998 0  $     142,700,000   $             16,400,000                                41,492  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 1999 0  $     155,200,000   $             18,300,000                                40,554  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2000 0  $     145,500,000   $               7,700,000                                39,865  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2001 0  $     160,020,000   $               9,450,000                                34,858  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2002 0  $     163,000,000   $             10,000,000                                32,141  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2003 0  $     156,000,000   $                               -                                  30,393  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2004 0  $     162,000,000   $             15,000,000                                29,399  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2005 0  $     172,000,000   $             28,000,000                                31,514  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2006 0  $     183,000,000   $             15,000,000                                31,881  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2007 0  $     199,000,000   $             28,000,000                                33,891  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2008 0  $     186,000,000   $               5,000,000                                31,269  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2009 0  $     188,000,000   $               2,000,000                                29,304  
MLB Atlanta Braves 2 2010 0  $     201,000,000   $             22,200,000                                30,989  
 
 In my analysis I looked at the difference between strong and weak franchises in 
each league and how they perform in the years leading up to and following a work 
stoppage.  The hypothesis before the analysis was that strong franchises would be able to 
recover in all three categories in less time than weak franchises in the same league.  My 
analysis provided the results seen in the following Tables 2-10. 
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NHL Team Attendance 
 Year Before Stoppage  Year after Stoppage  
Weak Franchises  15,485  15,668  
Strong Franchises  17,569  18,106  
 From my analysis I found that the 1994-1995 and 2004-2005 lockouts didn’t have 
major effects on team attendance, with a p>0.05.  I also found that, as expected, stronger 
franchises had a greater average attendance than weaker franchises before and after the 
work stoppages. 
NBA Team Attendance 
 Year Before Stoppage  Year after Stoppage  
Weak Franchises  16,340  15,832  
Strong Franchises  19,219  19,594  
 From my analysis I found that the 1998-1999 lockout didn’t have a major effect 
on team attendance, with a p>0.05.  I also found that, as expected, stronger franchises had 
a greater average attendance than weaker franchises both before and after the work 
stoppages. 
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MLB Team Attendance 
 Year Before Stoppage  Year after Stoppage  
Weak Franchises  28,378  21,427  
Strong Franchises  35,658  32,650  
From my analysis I found that the 1994-1995 strike had a large negative effect on 
team attendance, with a p<0.01.  Weak franchises lost on average 6,951 fans per game 
after the strike, or 24.49% of their average attendance.  In contrast, strong franchises lost 
on average 3,008 fans per game after the strike, or 8.44% of their average attendance.  
Thus, weak franchises were affected far more by the strike than strong franchises, 
although both were affected negatively. 
NHL Team Revenue 
 Year Before Stoppage  Year after Stoppage  
Weak Franchises  $65.05 M  $69.68 M  
Strong Franchises  $93.7 M  $86 M  
 From my analysis I found that the 1994-1995 and 2004-2005 lockouts had a 
negative effect on strong franchises and a positive effect on weak franchises.  Weak 
franchises gained $4,630,000 in revenue on average after the lockouts compared to 
revenues before the lockouts, with a p<0.01.  Strong franchises lost $7,700,000 in 
revenue on average after the lockouts compared to revenues before the lockouts, with a 
p<0.01.  Interestingly, this occurred despite attendance growth following the lockouts, as 
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previously shown.  One potential source of both the strong franchises’ losses and the 
weak franchises’ gains is the implementation of revenue sharing following the 2004-2005 
lockout.  As described previously, strong franchises are usually the top revenue-
producing franchises and thus these franchises would be required to give some of their 
revenue to the bottom revenue-producing franchises, generally the weaker franchises. 
NBA Team Revenue 
 Year Before Stoppage  Year after Stoppage  
Weak Franchises  $56.5 M  $77.77 M  
Strong Franchises  $85.98 M  $112 M  
 From my analysis I found that both weak and strong franchises increased their 
revenues following the 1998-1999 lockout.  Weak franchises saw their revenues increase 
by $21,270,000 on average, or by 37.64% of their average revenue.  Strong franchises 
saw their revenues increase by $26,020,000 on average, or by 30.26% of their average 
revenue.  This may reflect that the 1998-1999 lockout did not cause a cancellation of the 
playoffs following the regular season, as compared to the 1994-1995 MLB strike and the 
2004-2005 NHL lockout.  Why might this be the case?  Many casual fans do not follow 
their team avidly during the regular season, yet they “tune in” and buy tickets during the 
playoffs because of the increased energy, excitement, and importance of each game. 
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MLB Team Revenue 
 Year Before Stoppage  Year after Stoppage  
Weak Franchises  $53.88 M  $41.84 M  
Strong Franchises  $80.47 M  $68.4 M  
From my analysis I found that the 1994-1995 strike had a significant negative 
effect on both weak and strong franchises’ revenues, with a p<0.01.  Weak franchises lost 
$12,040,000 in revenue on average, while strong franchises lost $12,070,000 in revenue 
on average.  Though both weak and strong franchises lost nearly the same amount of 
revenue following the strike, weak franchises were more affected because their loss 
accounted for 22.35% of revenue compared to 15% for strong franchises. 
NHL Team Operating Income 
 Year Before Stoppage  Year after Stoppage  
Weak Franchises  -$5.35 M  $1.19 M  
Strong Franchises  $1.2 M  $9.3 M  
 From my analysis I found that both weak and strong franchises were able to 
improve their operating income following the 1994-1995 and 2004-2005 lockouts.  This 
suggests that cost cutting measures, such as lowering players’ salaries, were effective in 
increasing teams’ profits. 
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NBA Team Operating Income 
 Year Before Stoppage  Year after Stoppage  
Weak Franchises  $2.76 M  $1.68 M  
Strong Franchises  $16.59 M  $16.0 M  
 From my analysis I found that the 1998-1999 lockout did not have much of an 
effect on teams’ operating income, with p<0.05.  This is interesting considering the large 
increases in both weak franchises and strong franchises’ revenues, suggesting that players 
may have benefited from the lockout through increased salaries. 
MLB Team Operating Income 
 Year Before Stoppage  Year after Stoppage  
Weak Franchises  $3.73 M  -$1.16 M  
Strong Franchises  $10.18 M  $8.97 M  
 From my analysis I found that similar to attendance and team revenues, the 1994-
1995 strike had a negative effect on teams’ operating income, with p<0.01.  Though weak 
franchises went from positive to negative operating income following the strike and 
strong franchises decreased their operating income, these losses were not a large as the 
previously shown reductions in team revenues.  This suggests that cost cutting may have 
occurred, most likely by decreasing players’ salaries. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 From the results of my analysis I offer the following conclusions.  First, the effect 
of a strike or lockout on the subsequent strength of a league is not uniform.  Second, 
Major League Baseball suffered the most from the 1994-1995 strike of the four work 
stoppages studied.  League average attendance took 12 seasons to recover from the 1994-
1995 strike, and league average operating income took seven seasons to reach its 
previous levels of stability.  Overall popularity of Major League Baseball has been in a 
steady decline since the beginning of the strike in 1994, and Major League Baseball has 
been reduced from the second favorite sport in America to third in fan polls.  The reason 
for this dramatic result as compared to other work stoppages studied could be the rise in 
high-action sports in the early 1990’s.  Baseball has long been viewed as a slow-paced, 
drawn out game meant for casual fan involvement with few thrilling moments per game.  
Fast-paced sports such as ice hockey, basketball, and extreme sports such as 
skateboarding, snowboarding, and surfing were gaining national exposure and popularity 
due to the constant excitement and high energy levels.  The cancellation of the postseason 
and the World Series took away any potential interest for the casual fan that would 
usually start paying attention at that time.  Established sports such as baseball were 
slowly losing market share to these new competitors, and when baseball didn’t have any 
output for nearly eight months fans left to go to other forms of entertainment in droves. 
Third, with the exception of the 1998-1999 NBA lockout, team operating income 
did not decline as much as team revenue, suggesting that players’ salaries must have been 
affected negatively following each studied work stoppage.  Lastly, independent of the 
league analyzed the data suggest that the players lose the most as a result of a strike or 
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lockout.  Though players and owners are intertwined in a business relationship in which 
both sides are dependent on one another, owners generally gain their income through 
other means.  Owners are not dependent on the league for their personal wealth and thus 
can continue to live and prosper without games and seasons.  On the other hand player 
income is based largely on their contracts, with the exception of the top 1% who may 
attract lucrative endorsement deals and are therefore not as dependent on contract salaries.  
With this knowledge owners are more willing to toughen their negotiating stance until 
they get what they desire, which is usually lower players’ salaries.  Sean Burke, an NHL 
goaltender, stated at the end of the 2004-2005 lockout, "I don't think the deal that we're 
going to get would have been ratified last summer.  But I just think we've been worn 
down to the point where at this stage the deal would really have to be incredibly bad for 
the guys not to vote it in.  At least that's the sense I'm getting." 
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